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ABSTRACT
This essay proposes an alternative concept – Ottomentality – in order to more
adequately assess Turkey’s growing neo-Ottoman cultural ensemble. This
concept is deployed here to underscore the convergence of neoliberal and
neo-Ottoman rationalities and the discursive practices that are developed
around them for governing culture and managing a diverse society. The essay
contends that the convergence of these two rationalities has significantly
transformed the state’s approach to culture as a way of governing the social,
constituted a particular knowledge of multiculturalism, and a subject of
citizenry increasingly subjected to exclusion and discipline for expressing
critical views of this knowledge.
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Introduction
In 2012, the Turkish blockbuster The Conquest 1453 (Fetih 1453; Fetih here-
after), depicting the monumental Ottoman conquest of Istanbul, was
acclaimed for its domestic and international box-office success. The film
was funded by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism with the aim of promot-
ing Turkish cinema, as a national brand, in the global film industry.1 It is the
most expensive production of the Turkish film industry to date. The ruling
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) govern-
ment officials praised the film as ‘the best film ever made in the past years’
since it ‘represented all the events having occurred during the conquest.’2
Fetih is an ideal product of the AKP government’s renewed cultural policy,
which considers such cultural productions as cinema as a means for preser-
ving national culture and creating a national brand for Turkey to compete
in the global market.3 Since the Ottoman-Islamic cultural heritage is an essen-
tial component in the AKP’s vision of national culture – a civilization of
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tolerance and peaceful coexistence of different cultures and faiths – it plays a
central role in the processes of cultural preservation and nation branding.
Between 2011 and 2014, the Turkish television historical drama Magnifi-
cent Century (Muhteşem Yüzyıl, Muhteşem hereafter), featuring the life of
the sixteenth century Ottoman Sultan Süleyman, also attracted wide viewer-
ship in Turkey and abroad, especially in the Balkans and the Middle East.
Although the series generated increasing interests in Turkey’s tourism and
Ottoman-Islamic arts and history, it received more than 70,000 individual
complaints from local audience,4 government officials’ criticism, and
warning of being taken off the air from Radio and Television Supreme
Council (Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu; RTÜK). The criticisms pointed
at the series’ historical (in)accuracy, (mis)representation of the revered
Sultan as a hedonist, and harm to society’s traditional values. As the then
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan denounced, ‘[those] who toy with [tra-
ditional] values would be taught a lesson within the premises of law.’5 The
controversy over Muhteşem reveals the AKP government’s endeavor in not
only reviving the Ottoman-Islamic cultural heritage, but also establishing a
moral-religious ethical code of social conduct. As Erdoğan once stated, it is
the AKP government’s mission to ‘raise a generation that is conservative
and democratic and embraces the values and historical principles of its
nation.’6
Fetih andMuhteşem are two contrasting examples of the emergent cultural
ensemble of Ottoman-themed productions and sites that have proliferated
over the last decade. This cultural edifice, ranging from television series to
history museums, is marked by its civil society-based and market-oriented
characteristics. Before the 2000s, this cultural phenomenon would be
unthinkable since the secularist state perceived the Ottoman-Islamic past as
an obstacle to the nation’s modernization and thus restricted its presence
from public cultural life. Contemporary analyses that focus on this emergent
cultural phenomenon often associate it with the AKP’s neo-Ottomanism –
generally understood as an Islamist ideology and/or foreign policy seeking
to transform Turkey’s national identity based on the Ottoman-Islamic cul-
tural heritage.7 Nonetheless, the cases of Fetih and Muhteşem reveal a more
complex and contradictory relation between this cultural phenomenon and
the neo-Ottomanist ideology. While some productions may collide with the
neo-Ottomanist narrative, others seem to stray away from it. Since the repro-
duction of this cultural ensemble entails complex governing processes invol-
ving both the government and civil society, it may be insufficient to suggest
that it is merely a cultural facet of the neo-Ottomanist ideology and/or
foreign policy. In this regard, the analytical concept of neo-Ottomanism
seems to fall short for comprehending current form of neo-Ottomanism.
How does one understand the discrepancy of this emergent neo-Ottoman cul-
tural ensemble, which has a seemingly coherent shape? What are the forces
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that gave rise to this unprecedented cultural phenomenon, which was
unthinkable before the 2000s? What are the socio-political implications of
this emergent cultural form that may be overlooked by the conceptions of
neo-Ottomanism as an ‘ideology’ and ‘foreign policy’? And if the concept
of neo-Ottomanism has rather limited analytical utility, what could be a
more useful perspective for investigating Turkey’s renewed Ottoman motto?
This article takes the cases of Fetih and Muhteşem as a departure point to
reconsider the analytical concept of neo-Ottomanism in order to more ade-
quately explain the emergent cultural phenomenon. It undertakes three
tasks to address the above questions. First, through a brief historical overview
of the different phases of (neo-)Ottomanism between the late Ottoman period
and present, the article intends to illustrate the fluctuating characteristic of
neo-Ottomanism. This overview allows us to conceive neo-Ottomanism as
a historically contingent social process, where its configuration is constantly
changing and at times merging with other forces. Second, by critically enga-
ging with the common conceptions of neo-Ottomanism as ‘ideology’ and
‘foreign policy,’ the article argues that contemporary studies that adopt
these two approaches may run the risk of overlooking the complexity of the
latest phase of neo-Ottomanism, and hence may underestimate its effects
on society. Finally, by incorporating the Foucauldian perspective of govern-
mentality, the article proposes the concept of Ottomentality as an alternative
approach to the latest phase of neo-Ottomanism. The article contends that
cultural analyses may benefit from this perspective as it opens up new inves-
tigative questions for assessing the market-oriented and society-based charac-
teristics of the current phase of neo-Ottomanism.
Phases of neo-Ottomanism
It is important to note that neo-Ottomanism is neither a novel nor a mono-
lithic Islamist political thought of the AKP. Its historical roots can be traced
back to the late Ottoman period and it has continued to evolve throughout the
history of the Turkish Republic. Hakan Övünç Ongur points out four distinct
phases in which (neo-)Ottomanism has (re)emerged as a means to respond to
the different socio-political questions at particular historical moments.8 Otto-
manism was first formulated during the late Ottoman reform (Tanzimat
1839–1876) period as an ‘elitist multicultural project’ to mitigate the
growing nationalist movements and prevent the disintegration of the
Ottoman Empire.9 Initiated as a criticism of the Tanzimat reform policies,
inspired by the European civilization and political model, Ottomanism was
an opposing component emphasizing that the only way to rebuild unity
among Ottoman subjects was to construct an Ottoman identity based on
common cultural, historical, and traditional traits rather than blindly adopt-
ing the European model. Therefore, the Young Ottomans attempted to
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incorporate elements of Islam, pluralism, and imperialism to construct a new
Ottoman subject that would be loyal to the Empire.10
However, Ottomanism in its second phase of evolution, during the found-
ing period of the Turkish republic, was depoliticized and conceived of as a sign
of backwardness and opposition to the state’s modernization project. The
early republican elite’s radical reforms, which included the formation of the
Turkish Language Institute11 and Turkish History Thesis,12 were efforts of
systemic erasure of the Ottoman past and construction of a new Turkish
national identity based on common linguistic and historical ties. Yet, the
state’s repression did not entirely diminish the ideas of Ottomanism. For
instance, in the 1970s, a group of secular and conservative businessmen, intel-
lectuals, and politicians founded an organization called the Hearths of the
Enlightened (Aydınlar Ocağı) in which the Turkish-Islamic synthesis was
developed.13 This synthesis was formulated to redefine Turkish identity by
incorporating the component of Islamic civilization as an essential part of
Turkish culture.14 The Turkish-Islamic synthesis has played an important
role in the rise of Turkish political Islam and the reformulation of neo-Otto-
manism in the following decades.15
In its third phase of evolution during the 1980s and 1990s, neo-Ottoman-
ism was reformulated as a new framework for resolving socio-cultural ten-
sions resulting from cultural diversity and a renewed diplomatic strategy
focusing on regions of former Ottoman territory.16 According to Yılmaz
Çolak, Turgut Özal was a ‘leading figure in perpetuating Ottomanism as
the core of a political vision based on a new collective memory, for a new
form of foreign policy, and social contract’ by incorporating ‘Ottoman plur-
alism’ and ‘modern liberal multiculturalism.’17 Although neo-Ottomanism
briefly lost its momentum after Özal’s death in 1993, it continued to have
its influence in the discourses of the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi),
which formed a coalition government with the Right Path Party (Doğru
Yol Partisi) led by Tansu Çiller in 1995.18 Informed by the ideas of its prede-
cessor National Outlook (Milli Görüş) and Özal’s vision of institutionalizing
‘a new model of cultural pluralism based on the Ottoman legacy,’19 the
Welfare Party’s neo-Ottomanism ‘rejected the ethnic version of Turkish
nationalism and reinterpreted Turkish identity on the basis of regional and
religious grounds (multiethnic and multireligious bases) and cosmopolitan
liberal values.’20 Until this point, neo-Ottomanism had served as an
opponent responding to the republican elites’ efforts at nation building,
modernization, secularization. It had continued to invoke the Ottoman-
Islamic heritage in the public sphere to subvert the republican version of
modernity, historiography, and national identity.21 The Ottoman-Islamic
heritage was also utilized as a pragmatic means in policies to mitigate the
escalating social tension resulting from identity-based claims, most
notably, the Alevi and Kurdish questions.22
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Since 2002, after the AKP came to power and having consecutively ruled as
a single-party government, neo-Ottomanism has entered its latest phase of
transformation. It has become the governing power, instead of being an oppo-
sitional force for decades. According to Ongur, by evoking the Ottoman past,
the AKP in its early years of governance had attempted to create a liberal-con-
servative socio-political framework, ‘which defined its political agenda within
the boundaries of human rights, liberal-economic development and social
conservatism.’23 As he remarks, what distinguishes the AKP’s neo-Ottoman-
ism from the Özalian version and makes it more politically sustainable is its
prioritization of and strong connection with civil society. This connection is
compellingly evident in the wide spectrum of social practices and cultural
expressions. As he observes, the Ottoman theme has been promulgated
through such everyday practices as entertainment productions, Ottoman
language teaching in secondary schools, and urban designs and projects.
Employing Michael Billig’s notion of ‘banal nationalism,’24 he names this
latest phase of neo-Ottomanism ‘banal Ottomanism’:
[Unlike] under Ozal’s neo-Ottomanism, during the AKP era Ottomanism’s
social dimension appears to be prioritized […] This process is not carried
out by the government exclusively; once established, society itself assumes
the pivotal role in promulgating Ottoman images […] As current ‘banal Otto-
manism’ is perpetuated through practice by society itself, it therefore also func-
tions as mechanism of re-identification alienating today’s society from that of
the Republican era.25
Hence, according to Ongur, the latest phase of neo-Ottomanism continues to
function as a ‘re-identification process’ in which the neo-Ottomanist nation-
alist ideology is promulgated by the society itself and becomes a part of the
mundane everyday practice.
Ongur’s historical overview of the evolution of (neo-)Ottomanism is useful
as it allows the conception of neo-Ottomanism as a contingent social process
that its configuration and meaning alter at different historical junctures.
Nonetheless, as the cases of Fetih and Muhteşem reveal, the latest phase of
neo-Ottomanism seems to be a more complex process than an ideological
revolution and break from Kemalism as Ongur suggests. The ideological
work is indeed one of the most nuanced characteristics of current neo-Otto-
manism, and hence the society’s active role in reproducing ‘banal Ottoman-
ism’ may be interpreted as an indication of the triumph of the neo-
Ottomanist hegemons. But, how does this approach explain such cases as
Muhteşem in which the society, rather than the government, plays a vital
role in popularizing the Ottoman-Islamic past yet condemned by the public
and disciplined by such regulatory practice as media censorship? This
article argues that the conceptions of neo-Ottomanism as ‘ideology’ and
‘foreign policy’ are insufficient for explaining the discursive and micro-
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practices that constitute the complex and hybrid configuration of neo-Otto-
manism. Hence, in order to address this question, a critical evaluation of
the concept of neo-Ottomanism is necessary.
A critique of the concept of neo-Ottomanism
Although neo-Ottomanism was initially formulated by a collaborated
group of secular, liberal intellectuals and conservative Turkish political
actors in the 1980s, it is mostly associated with the consolidated socio-
economic and political power of the conservative elites. In current
Turkish domestic and foreign politics analyses, neo-Ottomanism is com-
monly conceptualized as a political ideology, or ‘doctrine’ (often referring
to Ahmet Davutoğlu’s Strategic Depth serving as the guidebook for
Turkey’s diplomatic strategy in the twenty-first century), which seeks to
construct a new national identity and reshape foreign policy.26 It has
become a key concept in domestic and foreign politics analyses especially
after Ahmet Davutoglu was appointed as the Foreign Minister in 2009. As
Darko Tanasković defines,
neo-Ottomanism is mostly taken to signify a complex macro-ideological plat-
form according to which present day Turkey, as a legitimate civilization heir of
the Ottoman Empire, should reaffirm its entire spiritual, cultural and political
legacy so that it could secure and effectively play the role of a global force to
reckon within the undergoing shift of power balance and influence in the
world.27
When conceptualized as an Islamist ideology and foreign policy of the post-
Cold War era, neo-Ottomanism is perceived as a competing counterpart of
Kemalism. This ideology serves as the referential point for Turkey’s foreign
policy in the context of a changing global order.28 For its advocates, neo-Otto-
manism is the antidote for the authoritarian, state-centric, and top-down pro-
jects of secularization and modernization. It is an alternative to the rigidly
defined unitary Turkish identity defined by ethnic and linguistic character-
istics, which have failed to encompass large segments of the ethnically
diverse society. It is argued that by invoking the shared Ottoman heritage,
incorporating Islam, and combining the ideas of Ottoman millet29 and
modern liberal multiculturalism, the decades-long Kurdish question and
other identity-based social issues could be resolved.30 As Özal once remarked,
‘I believe that the most powerful single constituting element of identity in this
society is Islam.’31 As a crucial element of neo-Ottomanism, Islam is seen as
the bonding element of society and a ‘liberal’ quest as it proclaims to ‘trans-
cend ethnic differences’ and unite the citizens on the basis of their common
Muslim identity.32 On the contrary, critics of neo-Ottomanism suggest that
despite its emphasis on liberal multiculturalism, it fails to produce a more
inclusive socio-political model as it claims to do. The neo-Ottomanists’
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selective reading of and pragmatic approach to the Ottoman past and its per-
sistence on Islam as the ethical code and binding element for the diverse
society nonetheless fails to acknowledge the ethno-religious differences and
the demands for cultural rights of its citizens.33
Notwithstanding the two camps of argument, one thing that the advocates
and critics of neo-Ottomanism have in common is that they both conceive of
neo-Ottomanism as an ideological shift and identity politics resulting from a
political struggle in opposition to Kemalism. Although this interpretation is
helpful for understanding the two major competing narratives of the
Turkish nation, it has produced persistent dichotomies of Kemalism vs.
neo-Ottomanism and secularism vs. Islamism. It also has produced certain
analytical trajectories, which may have undermined the explanatory value
of neo-Ottomanism in not only Turkish domestic and foreign politics, but
also the cultural milieu.
First, the ‘ideology’ and ‘policy’ conceptions tend to perceive neo-Otto-
manism as a monolithic, state-centric, hegemonic imposition upon society.
It presumes that this ideology, when implemented into domestic and
foreign policy, somehow has an effect on how the society perceives and
renews its ‘national interest’ and ‘identity.’ For instance, Hakan Yavuz
argues that Turkey’s identity and foreign policy formulations are inseparable
processes. According to him, the rise of neo-Ottomanism during the 1980s
and 1990s served as a form of Islamist nationalism seeking to redefine
Turkey’s national identity on the bases of a common Ottoman-Islamic heri-
tage and further influence its diplomatic strategy within the region. In his
comparative analysis of the neo-Ottomanist and Kemalist foreign policy
approaches, Ömer Taşpınar similarly suggests the intertwined relationship
between Turkish national identity and foreign policy. He points to the simi-
larity between Kemalism and neo-Ottomanism (both the Özalian and AKP
versions) that, despite their different approaches to the Kurdish question
and foreign policy in the Balkans, Central Asia, and Middle East, ‘at the
end of the day, both Kemalism and neo-Ottomanism share a state-centric
view of the world and Turkish national interests.’34 Yavuz’s and Taşpınar’s
arguments reflect the common conception of neo-Ottomanism as an Islamist
nationalist ideology that its consolidation since the 1980s has a direct impact
on Turkey’s national interest and understanding of what the Turkish nation
means, that is, a shift from Kemalism to neo-Ottomanism.
However, as Fatma Müge Göçek criticizes, the connection between nation-
alist ideology, national interest, and identity in such analyses as Taşpınar’s
remains unclear and questionable. Her sociological perspective suggests that
each social group, i.e. the Armenians, Greeks, or Kurds, may perceive its
relationship with the ‘Turkish nation’ differently than the one promulgated
by the Kemalist or neo-Ottomanist nationalist ideology. Göçek’s perspective
also leads one to question the often taken-for-granted view of the ideological
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function and hegemonic effect of neo-Ottomanism in transforming the collec-
tive memory and identity of Turkish society – a claim that is often made in
current cultural debates. The ideological claim has had an influence on how
cultural analysts understand the neo-Ottomanization of Turkey’s cultural
field. For instance, in her discussions of the Miniatürk theme park and the
1453 Panorama History Museum, Şeyda Barlas Bozkuş argues that these
two sites are crucial for understanding the ‘AKP’s neo-Ottomanist nationalist
ideology […] in creating a new class of citizens with a new relationship to
Turkish-Ottoman national identity.’35 The problem of this view is that it
tends to assume that these cultural sites function as merely representational
devices of the neo-Ottomanist ideology.
The ideological function of the emergent Ottoman-themed cultural forms
is indeed indubitable. Yet, as mentioned earlier, neo-Ottomanism in Turkey’s
current cultural field has taken a unique form, which not only prioritizes the
society but is also practiced by the society itself. Neo-Ottomanism, in its
current phase, is not merely a set of ideas articulated by political actors as a
way of negotiating what the Turkish nation means in domestic and foreign
politics, but tangible practices and objects that are commodified and con-
sumed as commercial products in everyday life. It is also important to note
that current neo-Ottomanism is often practiced based on market principles,
which involves the withdraw of the state’s role as a provider of arts and
culture to the public, transformation of the cultural sphere into a free
market, and reduction of the state’s intervention to ensure the functioning
of the free market of culture. The relationship between neo-Ottomanism
and neoliberalism will be discussed shortly, but at this point some questions
arise. How does one explain the current phase of neo-Ottomanism, which
cannot be reduced as a set of Islamist ideas seeking to produce a new collective
memory, history, and identity of Turkey? How does one make sense of
Turkey’s current cultural neo-Ottomanization that is not practiced exclusively
by the state and government, but more often in a privatized, commercialized,
and market-oriented fashion? And what is the significance of this particular
cultural form of neo-Ottomanism for Turkish society?
These questions lead to the second critique of the ‘ideology’ and ‘foreign
policy’ conceptions of neo-Ottomanism. These two conceptions tend to fail
to acknowledge the hybrid and complex characteristics of the current phase
of neo-Ottomanism, which often relies on and blends with other political pro-
jects such as the ongoing European Union (EU) accession, globalization, and
neoliberalism. They tend to assume that the neo-Ottomanist ideology is
internally consistent and implemented straightforwardly into (foreign)
policy, which further has a hegemonic effect on how the society perceives
its collective identity. However, when closely examined, current forms of
what Ongur describes as ‘banal Ottomanism’ are more likely to reveal the dis-
cursive processes and interwoven relations of neo-Ottomanism with other
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political strategies, projects and programs. When taking into account the see-
mingly disconnected forces, it is possible to identify a distinctive configuration
of neo-Ottomanism that is currently at question as well as the various coor-
dinates at which neo-Ottomanism and other political thoughts, strategies,
policies, and projects intersect. Moreover, it is also likely to identify the
internal inconsistencies of neo-Ottomanism as the cases of Fetih and Muhte-
şem illustrate.
Recent studies on Turkey’s experience with neoliberalism reveal overlap-
ping relationships between several political forces that are pertinent for reas-
sessing the concept of neo-Ottomanism and comprehending the neo-
Ottoman cultural phenomenon in Turkey today. These overlapping relation-
ships are feasible in the areas of urban renewal projects,36 emergent forms of
social service provision,37 health and family care programs,38 national edu-
cation,39 and cultural policy.40 This body of literature underscores that
Turkey’s accelerated EU accession between the late 1990s and mid-2000s pro-
vided timely opportunity for the conservative democratic AKP government to
pursue economic, social, and political reforms. These studies perceive neo-
Ottomanism as a tactic of the AKP government aiming at realigning society’s
norms and moral values based on a selective, pragmatic interpretation of
Sunni Islam and Ottoman-Islamic heritage. As Yıldız Atasoy suggests, the
Ottoman-Islamic heritage is central for the AKP to promulgate an
Ottoman-Islamic civilizational discourse, which sees Turkey as the center of
world civilization. According to her, the AKP has tactically blended the
Ottoman-Islamic culture, heritage, and tradition with the European values
of liberal democracy, human rights, and freedom of expression and formu-
lated an alternate version of universalism that is authentic, homegrown,
and characteristically neoconservative.41 Atasoy’s useful insight of the
unique combination of neoliberalism and Islam(ism) may offer a way for
rethinking neo-Ottomanism beyond the ‘ideology’ and ‘foreign policy’ trajec-
tories. Her meticulous analysis of Turkey’s experiment with neoliberalism
illustrates that neo-Ottomanism always relies on opportune political
moments and various political projects for advancing its agenda. Her view
therefore allows us to acknowledge the hybrid, complex, and fluctuating
characteristics of neo-Ottomanism that it exists not as a coherent ideology
or an established set of policies, but very much depends on the discourses, pol-
icies, and strategies of EU negotiation between the late 1990s and mid-2000s,
neoliberalism, globalization, and democratization that without which its for-
mulation would not have been possible.
From neo-Ottomanism to Ottomentality
In order to more adequately assess the socio-political significance of
Turkey’s emergent neo-Ottoman cultural phenomenon, this article
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proposes a conceptual shift from neo-Ottomanism to Ottomentality. This
shift involves not only rethinking neo-Ottomanism as a form of govern-
mentality, but also thinking of neoliberal and neo-Ottoman rationalities
in collaborative terms. According to Foucault, governmentality is ‘under-
stood in the broad sense of techniques and procedures for directing
human behavior. Government of children, government of souls and con-
sciences, government of a household, of a state, or of oneself.’42 Here,
this study is concerned with the government of culture and diversity
under the AKP’s administration. This approach is less concerned with a
particular political ideology or the question of ‘how to govern.’ and
more about the ‘different styles of thought, their conditions of formation,
the principles and knowledge that they borrow from and generate, the
practices they consist of, how they are carried out, their contestations
and alliances with other arts of governing.’43 This approach sees that neo-
liberalism and neo-Ottomanism are two interdependent forces that when
they converge, they generate new modes of governing the cultural life of
society based on market and neoconservative rationalities. The AKP’s
endeavor in transforming such social provisions and public services as
culture in line with neoliberal rationality enables it to create ever-new
spheres of freedom – the market – in which private individuals become
autonomized and responsible for exercising their rights to freedom (of
choice, lifestyle, expression, etc.) through their active participation in the
emergent culture market. It is through the private individuals’ own exercise
of freedom in the market that they become subjugated to the disciplinary
practices of managing culture and diversity. On the one hand, the individ-
uals are obliged to comply with the rules of the market; they must conduct
themselves as entrepreneurs and consumers so as to become active and
responsible citizens. On the other hand, they are also obliged to act in
accordance with a set of moral-religious rules and a multireligious and
multiethnic social order based on a selective and pragmatic interpretation
of Ottoman-Islamic pluralism. The multiple discourses, strategies, and pol-
icies concerning Turkey’s EU negotiation, globalization, economic growth,
democratization, and cultural governance therefore constitute a whole new
set of ethical codes for directing conducts of the emergent spheres of
freedom. And through their autonomy, the free individuals become subju-
gated to the government of culture and diversity. Hence, as Foucault notes,
this double movement ‘between the technologies of domination of the
others and those of the self’ is what he calls ‘governmentality.’44
Neo-Ottomanism is conceived here as Turkey’s current form of neocon-
servatism, a prevalent political rationality that its governmental practices
are not solely based on a politicized view of Islam and Islamic values,
but also draws from and produces a new political culture that considers
Ottoman-Islamic civilization, its model of toleration and pluralism in
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particular, as the foundation of multicultural democracy for Turkey. Neo-
liberalism, in the same vein, far from a totalizing concept describing an
established set of political ideology or economic policy, is understood
here as a historically contingent and locally specific form of governmental-
ity that must be analyzed by taking into account the multiple political
forces which gave its unique configuration in Turkey.45 In light of this per-
spective, and for practical purposes, Ottomentality is an alternative concept
that is developed here to avoid the ambiguity, competing meanings, and
analytical limitations of neo-Ottomanism. This concept underscores the
convergence of neoliberalism and neo-Ottomanism as well as the inter-
related discourses, projects, policies, and strategies that are developed
around them for governing cultural activities and regulating diversity in
Turkey. It pays specific attention to the techniques and practices that
aim at transforming culture and reshaping society. It is concerned with
the production of knowledge, or truth, based on which a new social
reality of multicultural democracy based on a selective view of Ottoman
millet is constituted. Furthermore, it helps to identify the type of political
subject, whose demand for cultural rights and participatory democracy is
reduced to market terms and a narrow understanding of multiculturalism.
And their criticism of this new social reality is increasingly subjected to
judicial exclusion and discipline.
It should be noted that Ottomentality is an authoritarian type of govern-
mentality – a specific type of illiberal rule operated within the structure of
modern liberal democracy. As Mitchell Dean notes, although the literature
on governmentality has focused mainly on liberal democratic rules that are
practiced through the individual subjects’ active role and exercise of
freedom, there are also ‘non-liberal and explicitly authoritarian types of
rule that seek to operate through obedient rather than free subjects, or, at a
minimum, endeavor to neutralize any opposition to authority.’46 He suggests
that a useful way to approach this type of governmentality would be to ident-
ify the practices and rationalities that ‘divide’ or ‘exclude’ those who are sub-
jected to be governed.47 According to Foucault’s notion of ‘dividing practices,’
‘[t]he subject is either divided inside himself or divided from others. This
process objectivizes him. Examples are the mad and the sane, the sick and
the healthy, the criminals and the “good boys.”’48 Turkey’s growing neo-
Ottoman cultural ensemble can be considered as such exclusionary practices
which seek to regulate the diverse culture by dividing the subjects into categ-
orical, if not polarized, segments based on their cultural differences. For
instance, mundane practices such as going to the museum and investing in
television productions may produce such divided subjects as the pious and
the secular, the moral and the degenerate, and the Sunni-Muslim-Turk and
the ethno-religious minorities.
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Reassessing the neo-ottoman cultural phenomenon through
the lens of Ottomentality
Fetih and Muhteşem are vital cases through which the recent neo-Ottomani-
zation of Turkey’s cultural field will be reassessed. The two cases are particu-
larly pertinent as they reveal the complex, hybrid, and internally contradictory
characteristics of current phase of neo-Ottomanism in Turkey. They also
present a compelling example of the discursive, dividing practices entailed
in constituting a governable subject of citizenry. As the AKP’s cultural inter-
vention in line with neoliberal rationality transforms the cultural field into an
integral part of the free market, it creates new spheres of freedom wherein
individuals conduct themselves and in relation with the others in accordance
with market imperatives. Active civil participation, in the forms of entrepre-
neurship and consumption in this culture market, is regarded as a norm and
means of exercising freedom and democracy. It is through the active citizens’
own exercise of freedom (of choice, lifestyle, expression, etc.) that they
become subjugated to such regulatory practices as media censorship, sponsor-
ship law, and cultural policy, etc. Hence, these governmental practices consti-
tute a subject of citizenry divided within and among themselves as they
participate in the culture market.
According to Asu Aksoy, what differentiates the AKP’s approach to cul-
tural policy from the early republic’s state-centered model is that the
market mentality has become the administrative norm.49 With the aim of
more efficiently managing such public services as culture, the AKP heavily
relies on privatization as a means to limit the state’s role in governance.
The rationale of privatization entails that the responsibility of administering
culture in such areas as television, theater, and cinema should be transferred
to the civil society as to reduce the state’s burden of providing public ser-
vices.50 For instance, the reorganization of the media sector and administra-
tive reform of Turkish Television and Radio Corporation (Türkiye Radyo
Televizyon Kurumu; TRT) during the 2000s indicate the AKP’s effort in trans-
forming public cultural services into competitive markets wherein private
initiatives take on active and responsible roles in providing the necessary
capital and productions.51 By means of bidding, tax incentives, and ministerial
funding, private sectors are encouraged to undertake governmental projects
that aim at promoting Turkish culture on domestic and global platforms.
For example, with the enactment of the new TRT law in 2008, TRT is now
able to outsource its productions to private media companies and to generate
revenue through the advertising market and sales of its productions.52 The
collaboration between TRT and such private media companies as Animax,
who produces Ottoman-themed programs for TRT Çocuk (children’s)
channel, is exemplary of the prioritization of private sector in AKP’s cultural
management. The case of TRT hence indicates that the strategy of
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privatization has opened up spheres of freedom for citizens to engage in par-
ticipatory democracy in market terms.53
Nonetheless, the right to exercise freedom and participatory democracy
through the market is not to be understood as without regulations or bound-
aries. As Wendy Larner notes, although neoliberalism is based on the idea of
minimum state interference, ‘it does not follow that there is less governance.’54
As the Turkish media market encourages participation of private actors, the
government must also invent new strategies and rules to guide them to
produce the desirable type of culture that is in conformity with the govern-
ment’s vision for a virtuous society. Such media regulatory establishments
as RTÜK and the General Directorate of Cinema thus play a crucial role in
determining the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ media productions for the general public.
The contrasting cases of Fetih and Muhteşem hence exemplify the govern-
ment’s carrot-and-stick technique in regulating the culture market and mana-
ging diversity.
In addition, the cases of Fetih and Muhteşem reveal the AKP’s assertion of
its moral-religious authority in the government of culture and diversity.
Wendy Brown argues that, as the notion of nation state sovereignty
becomes weakened by the processes of economic liberalization and globaliza-
tion, the boundary that separates religion and state becomes blurred. As a
result, religion becomes ‘de-privatized’ and surges back into the public
sphere.55 In the Turkish context, this blurred boundary between religion
and state has enabled the neoconservative AKP to establish links between
moral-religious authority and state authority as well as between religious
truth and political truth. These links are evident in the AKP officials’ public
statements declaring the government’s moral mission of restoring Turkish
culture in accordance with Islamic and traditional values. For instance, as
Erdoğan reacted to his secular opponent’s comment about the AKP’s interfer-
ence in politics with religious views, ‘we [AKP] will raise a generation that is
conservative and democratic and embraces the values and historical principles
of its nation.’56 According to his view, despite Muhteşem’s contribution of
generating growth in industries of culture and tourism, it became subjected
to censorship and legal action because its content did not comply with the
governing authority’s moral mission. The controversy ofMuhteşem illustrates
the rise of a religion-based political truth in Turkey, which sees Islam as the
primary reference for directing society’s moral conduct and individual life-
style. Henceforth, by rewarding desirable actions (with sponsorship law and
tax incentives) and punishing undesirable ones (through censorship, media
banishment, and jail term for media practitioners’ misconduct), a divided
subject of citizenry along moral-religious lines is constituted. As the market
mechanisms enable the promulgation of moral-religious values, the active citi-
zens are also offered a choice of identity as virtuous citizens, who should
conduct their life and their relationship with the others based on Islamic
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norms and values. While exercising their freedom at the market place, the citi-
zens are also reminded of their responsibility to preserve traditional value,
family structure, and gender relations. Those who deviate from the norm
are subjected to public condemnation and punishment.
Moreover, the AKP officials’ praise for Fetih indicates its endeavor in a
neo-Ottomanist knowledge. This knowledge perceives Islam as the centripetal
force for enhancing social cohesion by transcending differences between faith
and ethnic groups. It rejects candid and critical interpretations of history and
insists on a singular view of Ottoman-Islamic pluralism and a pragmatic
understanding of the relationship between religion and state.57 It does not
require historical accuracy since religious truth is cast as historical and politi-
cal truth. For instance, a consistent narrative of the conquest can be observed
in such productions the film Fetih. This narrative begins with the Prophet
Muhammad’s prophecy of the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul. When history
is narrated from a religious point of view, it becomes indisputable as it
would imply challenge to religious truth, hence God’s will. Nonetheless, the
neo-Ottomanist knowledge conceives of the conquest not only as an
Ottoman victory in the past, but an incontestable living truth in Turkey’s
present. As Nevzat Bayhan, former general manager of Culture Inc. (Kültür
A.Ş.) in association with the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, stated at
the opening ceremony of Istanbul’s Panorama 1453 History Museum,
The conquest [of Istanbul] is not about taking over the city […] but to make the
city livable […] and its populace happy. Today, Istanbul continues to present to
the world as a place where Armenians, Syriacs, Kurds […] Muslims, Jews, and
Christians peacefully live together.58
Bayhan’s statement illustrates the centrality of the 1453 conquest in the neo-
Ottomanist knowledge because it marks the foundation of a civilization of tol-
erance, diversity, and peaceful coexistence in Turkey. While the neo-Ottoma-
nist knowledge may conveniently serve the branding purpose for promoting
Turkey in the global context, it more significantly rationalizes the governmen-
tal practices in reshaping the inter-ethnic and inter-faith relations in Turkey.
The knowledge also produces a political norm of indifference – one that is
reluctant to recognize ethno-religious differences among populace, uncritical
of the limits of Islam-based cultural pluralism, and more significantly, indif-
ferent about state-sanctioned discrimination and violence against the ethno-
religious minorities.
As the neo-Ottomanist cultural ensemble reproduces and mediates a neo-
Ottomanist knowledge in such commodities as the film Fetih, consumer citi-
zens are exposed to a new set of symbolic meanings of Ottoman-Islamic tol-
eration, pluralism, and peaceful coexistence, albeit through a view of the
Ottoman past fixated on its ‘magnificence’ rather than its ‘monstrosity.’59
This knowledge sets the norm for private citizens to think of themselves in
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relation to the other ethno-religious groups based on a hierarchical social
order, which subordinates minorities to the rule of Sunni Islamic government.
When this imagery of magnificence serves as the central component in nation
branding, it encourages citizens to take pride and identify with their Ottoman-
Islamic heritage. As such, Turkey’s nation branding perhaps also can be con-
sidered as a novel technology of the self as it requires citizens, be it business
sectors, historians, or filmmakers, to take on their active role in building an
image of tolerant and multicultural Turkey through arts and culture. It is in
this regard that neo-Ottomanism is considered as a form of governmentality
as it produces a citizenry, who actively participates in the reproduction of neo-
Ottomanist knowledge and continues to remain uncritical about the ‘dark
legacy of the Ottoman past.’60 Consequently, Ottomentality has produced a
type of subject that is constantly subjected to dividing techniques ‘that will
divide populations and exclude certain categories from the status of the
autonomous and rational person.’61
Conclusion
This article has proposed a reconceptualization of neo-Ottomanism as a form
of governmentality in order to more adequately assess the significance of the
emergent neo-Ottoman cultural ensemble on Turkish society. This concep-
tual move calls for a critical engagement with the conventional interpretations
of neo-Ottomanism as an ideology and foreign policy. It also entails new
inquiries for analyzing the micro-governmental practices that aim at
shaping individual cultural conducts and inter-cultural relations. As the
cases of Fetih and Muhteşem illustrate, Turkey’s renewed Ottoman motto
reveals not only a re-identification process of Turkish culture with the
Ottoman-Islamic past, but also new modalities of governing culture and
managing diversity. The article maintains that it is through such an engage-
ment with the multiple and intersecting political rationalities, strategies,
and policies of cultural governance that one can begin to understand the sig-
nificance of the seemingly mundane and dispersed practices of the neo-
Ottoman cultural ensemble on the social. Thus, such a conceptual move is
necessary as it offers alternative and more productive ways of analysis
through which discussions of potential political and cultural intervention
may be generated.
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48. Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 208.
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